Identity · W3C DID Core + Verifiable Credentials on Aurigraph DLT · status as of 2026-10-20
Regulated tokenization forces a contradiction: assets must carry a legally verifiable identity to satisfy KYC/AML, FATF Travel Rule, MiCA, and eIDAS — yet exposing that identity on a shared ledger creates correlation risk, surveillance surface, and GDPR liability. Aurigraph resolves this with a W3C DID Core v1.0 decentralized-identity ledger and W3C Verifiable Credentials as the interoperable envelope for machine-verifiable claims. Every DID is anchored to a persistent Merkle tree whose root is signed with ML-DSA-87 — NIST FIPS 204, Category 5; registry signing key not yet persisted — and every lifecycle event emits a DMRV attestation to a tamper-evident audit chain. Identity is not a wallet address inferred after the fact; it is a first-class credential that binds into every asset token through the Composite Token Framework (CTF).
This paper describes what ships today — the DID ledger, Merkle anchoring, post-quantum-signed credentials, and the CTF identity layer — and is deliberately honest about what is still in progress: cryptographic selective disclosure over BBS+ signatures and the OID4VP/OID4VCI wallet-presentation flow currently exist as development simulations (tracked under AV11-3116), not production paths. We describe the target architecture for those and mark their status explicitly.
A token on a public ledger records who owns how much. For a regulated real-world asset that is not enough — and, paradoxically, it is simultaneously too much.
Too little. A wallet address is not a KYC'd legal identity. Under the FATF Travel Rule, MiCA, or most securities regimes, ownership without verified identity of the originator and beneficiary is unusable. A verifier cannot answer "who is the counterparty, really?" from an address alone.
Too much. The naive fix — attaching KYC data to on-chain transactions — is catastrophic for privacy. A permanent, public ledger with identity attached makes every transaction linkable and correlatable: an observer can reconstruct a party's entire asset history, holdings, and counterparties. This violates GDPR data-minimization (Art. 5) and creates a standing breach liability. It also fails the right to be forgotten (GDPR Art. 17), since immutable ledgers do not forget.
The requirement, then, is a system that lets a verifier confirm exactly the claim they need — "this holder is KYC-verified in the EU," "this token is MiCA-compliant" — without exposing the underlying identity, the rest of the credential, or a correlatable public record. That is the problem decentralized identity and verifiable credentials were designed to solve, and it is the problem Aurigraph's DID ledger targets.
Aurigraph operates its own DID ledger rather than depending on a third-party registry. The ledger is W3C DID Core v1.0 compliant with a native did:aurigraph:... method supporting creation, resolution, versioned update, and deactivation.
did:aurigraph:...
The three roles of the verifiable-credential trust triangle map directly onto the platform:
DID methods and resolution. Every DID resolves to a versioned DID Document backed by four independently verifiable facet tokens created via the Composite Token Framework:
did
@context
Anchoring. Each DID operation writes a leaf into a Merkle registry (depth 20, ~1M-entry capacity, SHA-256). The root is re-signed with ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) either immediately (per-operation — design target under 100 ms, for high-value identity and regulatory onboarding) or in batched mode (amortized, for bulk imports and IoT device registration). Because the root is signed and every leaf carries an O(log n) inclusion proof, a DID document is independently verifiable by any party holding the signed root — no trust in the registry operator is required. Proofs export in portable JSON-LD and JWT formats, and the CrossChainProofBridge can export them in EVM- and Solana-native encodings; verifier contracts on those chains are not deployed, and the EVM attestation is currently signed with an ephemeral ECDSA key (AV11-3853). See the DID Ledger feature for the full registry design and API.
CrossChainProofBridge
The privacy goal is prove one claim, reveal nothing else: a holder should be able to demonstrate "this token is MiCA-compliant" or "I am over 18 and KYC-verified in the EU" while the verifier learns only that fact — not the holder's name, not the other layers of the credential, and not a correlatable identifier reusable across verifiers.
The target mechanism is a BBS+ signature scheme, which allows a holder to derive a zero-knowledge proof of selective disclosure from a multi-message signed credential — revealing a chosen subset of attributes and proving the rest exist and are signed, without disclosing them. Presentation would flow over OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OID4VP) and OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OID4VCI), the emerging interoperability standard for wallet-based credential exchange, with SD-JWT-VC as an alternate selective-disclosure serialization.
Honest status (AV11-3116). These selective-disclosure paths are not yet live in production. In the current codebase, the BBS+ engine and the OID4VCI/OID4VP wallet flow exist as deterministic development simulations used for test and design validation only. Concretely, per the source itself:
alg:none
We state this plainly because a credential system's value is exactly its cryptographic guarantee — describing a simulation as if it were live would defeat the purpose. What is live and privacy-relevant today: the DID ledger's layer separation (a regulator can be shown the Compliance facet without the Provenance facet), DID deactivation for GDPR Art. 17, and minimal-disclosure proof export. Full cryptographic BBS+ selective disclosure is on the roadmap (§7).
Merkle roots on the Aurigraph DID ledger, and platform-issued credentials, are signed with ML-DSA-87 (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) — the parameter set standardized by NIST FIPS 204 at Category 5, the highest defined. Status as of 2026-10-19: root signing is in the V12 source, but the registry signing key is generated in memory per tree and not yet persisted, so roots signed before a restart verify against a different key; ML-DSA-87 Data Integrity proofs on platform-issued credentials are in the V12 source since AV11-3534; DID private keys are envelope-encrypted with AES-256-GCM under an OpenBao key-encryption key in merged code that is not yet deployed (AV11-3771).
Post-quantum signatures matter here for two distinct threats:
The proof block in an exported credential names the suite explicitly ("type": "DataIntegrityProof", "cryptosuite": "aurigraph-ml-dsa-87-jcs-2026"), the verification method resolves to the issuer's did:aurigraph:...#key-1, and the ML-DSA-87 signing primitive measures about 0.3 ms per signature on the production code path (JMH, 2026-10-19, loaded laptop — an upper bound) — fast enough for immediate-mode anchoring. Named classical exceptions around the identity layer: Ed25519 remains available as a facet key type for interoperability with classical verifiers, KYC records are signed with Ed25519 today, and the cross-chain attestation uses an ephemeral ECDSA key (AV11-3853); Know-Your-Agent (KYA) signs with ML-DSA-65 (Category 3). The ledger's intended root of trust is post-quantum at Category 5.
"type": "DataIntegrityProof"
"cryptosuite": "aurigraph-ml-dsa-87-jcs-2026"
did:aurigraph:...#key-1
Decentralized identity is most powerful when it is not a standalone silo but the first layer of every asset credential. The Composite Token Framework (CTF) makes DID identity Layer 1 of a five-layer W3C Verifiable Credential:
did:aurigraph:asset:<id>
A did:aurigraph:... in the identity layer resolves to a composite token in its own right, whose four facets (Identity, Key, Provenance, Compliance) mirror the CTF structure — so an identity credential and an asset credential verify by the same rules and the same signature check. The five layers are packaged as a single W3C Verifiable Credential and signed once, across all layers, with ML-DSA-87. This is an all-or-nothing envelope: alter the compliance layer, strip the identity binding, or substitute a key, and the one signature check fails. Separate-but-linked identity tokens cannot offer this — their links break, are forgeable, and degrade verification into slow trust-fragile graph traversal.
The practical payoff: a verifier confirms who the counterparty is, that they are KYC-verified, and that the asset is authentic in one signature check on first contact — the property that makes CTF the substrate beneath Aurigraph's regulated-asset verticals. For the full five-layer design, see the Composite Token Framework whitepaper.
DID_DEACTIVATED
did:aurigraph:
The near-term priority is replacing the BBS+ and OID4VP simulations with real cryptographic implementations against a production wallet SDK and authorization server, closing the gap between the target privacy architecture (§3) and the shipping ledger.
Regulated tokenization needs identity to be verifiable and private at once — a contradiction that neither a bare wallet address (too little identity) nor on-chain KYC (too much exposure) resolves. Aurigraph's answer is a W3C DID Core ledger with post-quantum-signed, Merkle-anchored credentials, folded directly into every asset token as the CTF identity layer, so a verifier confirms who, compliant, and authentic in a single ML-DSA-87 signature check. The identity ledger, its four-facet decomposition, NIST Category 5 signatures, and DMRV audit chain ship today. The cryptographic selective-disclosure layer — BBS+ and OID4VP — is deliberately marked in progress, simulation-only under AV11-3116, because a credential system is only as trustworthy as the honesty of its claims. For the platform this identity fabric runs on — HyperRAFT++ consensus (running in SIMULATE mode in production until real multi-node consensus ships), Level 5 PQC, and deterministic settlement — see the Aurigraph DLT whitepaper.
SIMULATE
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